Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet . Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. He is the author of. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. Simultaneously, U.S. SIGINT was placed on increased alert to monitor indications of future North Vietnamese threats to the Desoto Missions, and additional air and naval forces were deployed to the Western Pacific. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. 10. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. The NSA report is revealing. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. Gulf of Tonkin Conspiracy Theory The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home Operation Fast and Furious 10 8. Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. National Security Agency Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. The first reports of the encounter from the destroyers reached the White House at 1000 EDT. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. When Did the U.S. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Both U.S. ships opened fire on the radar contacts, but reported problems maintaining a lock on the tracking and fire control solution. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. The United States denied involvement. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. In turn, that means The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. He headed seaward hoping to avoid a confrontation until daybreak, then returned to the coast at 1045, this time north of Hon Me. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. including the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam (the resolution passed the House 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2; in January 1971 President Nixon signed legislation that included its "repeal"). But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. Gulf Of Tonkin You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 11. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. There remains some disagreement among historians about the second (Aug. 4) incident, which involved the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." 1, p. 646. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. Hanoi denied the charge that it had fired on the U.S. destroyers on 4 August, calling the charge "an impudent fabrication. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. The truth about 'False Flags' from Nazi Germany to the Vietnam War Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. 13. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. Hickman, Kennedy. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. Vietnam is a very watery country. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. The Health Conspiracy. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. 2. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. The departure of the North Vietnamese salvage tug en route to the damaged craft was reported to the American ships as a submarine chaser, not a serious threat but certainly more so than an unarmed seagoing tug. On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. The stage was set. :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". Gulf of Tonkin incident | Definition, Date, Summary, Significance Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense For the maritime part of the covert operation, Nasty-class fast patrol boats were purchased quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United States was not involved in the operations.
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